Recent Decisions by Alton, Jack R. et al.
Recent Decisions
CONTRACTS - OPEN PRICE AGREEMENTS - FAIR TRADE LAWS
Seller brought an action for breach of contract upon buyer's
refusal to accept electric irons pursuant to contract. Buyer con-
tended the contract was void because seller reserved the right to
change prices, to be ". . . . shown in the company's current price
sheet, and as established from time to time by the company." Buyer
agrees to ". . . merchandise the company's products at full list price
and in accordance with the Fair Trade Act.. . ." Held, for defend-
ant. The court said a contract cannot be enforced where the price is
conditioned entirely on the will of one of the parties-". . . it was
essential to its validity that it should have been mutually obliga-
tory upon both parties." Taller & Cooper v. Illuminating Electric
Co., 172 F. 2d 625 (7th Cir. 1949).
Noted writers have called attention to the confused use of mu-
tuality in the cases, one writer saying that requiring mutuality is
an unnecessary way of stating that there must be a valid considera-
tion, WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §141 (2d ed. 1936), while another
states that ". . . the doctrine of mutuality of obligation not only
is not supported by most of the actual decisions but has outlived
any possible period of usefulness." The modern doctrine of con-
structive conditions makes mutuality unnecessary. GRISmORE, LAW
OF CONTRACTS §68 (1947). A promise need not be legally binding
to constitute sufficient consideration. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§84(E). The proper inquiry should be whether the promise is so
indefinite as to render it illusory.
It is not absolutely necessary to name a price in the contract,
since the court will fix a reasonable price in its absence. Patterson-
Ballagh Corp. v. Byron Jackson Co., 145 F. 2d 786 (9th Cir. 1944).
No objection has been made to contracts with price based on mate-
rial and labor costs. E. F. Prichard Co., Inc. v. Heidelberg Brewing
Co., 307 Ky. 833, 212 S.W. 2d 293 (1948) ; American Weekly, Inc.
v. Hauston Printing Corp., 134 F. 2d 447 (5th Cir. 1943). Con-
tracts with prices based on factors beyond seller's control, such as
market price or prices set by competitors, are also valid. South
Carolina Cotton Growers Coop. Assn. v. Weil, 220 Ala. 568, 126 So.
637 (1929) ; Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 Pac.
206 (1931). Thus there is no requirement that the price be def-
initely ascertainable when the contract is made.
Other courts have upheld contracts where the parties agreed
that the seller could change prices via new price schedules. Pure
Oil Co. v. Tucker, 70 F. Supp. 766 (S.D. Iowa 1947); Standard
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Oil Co. v. Wright Oil Service Co., 26 F. 2d 895 (4th Cir. 1928) ;
Kings County Packing Co. v. Sunland Sales Coop. Assn., 279 Pac.
1036, 100 Cal. App. 126 (1929). Even where both list price and
discount rate could be changed by the seller, the contract was up-
held. Ken-Rad Corp. v. R. C. Bohannan, Inc., 80 F. 2d 251 (6th
Cir. 1935). Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
which wrote the principal opinion, upheld an open price contract in
Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F. 2d 618 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied
311 U.S. 688, and recently fully approved the rule. Anderson &
Brown Co. v. Anderson, 161 F. 2d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 1947). With
the majority of other cases and its own decisions against it, there
appears little justification for the decision in the instant case.
Not only do the cases support open price contracts, but reason
as well, for the seller ". . . is not free to fix prices at will, if he
has any expectation of ever selling them again." Prosser, Open
Price in Sales Contracts, 16 MINN. L. REv. 733 (1932). The contract
in effect is one to sell at the lowest price given to any other, which
provision has been upheld. Mantell v. International Plastic Har-
monica Corp., 138 N.J. Eq. 562, 49 A. 2d 290 (1946). It has been
suggested that the requirements of good faith and fair dealing
should be injected into such contracts. Calif. Prune & Apricot
Growers v. Wood & Selick, 2 F. 2d 88 (S.D. N.Y. 1924). The court
in the instant case did not consider the problem of good faith the
buyer had, however, accepted a shipment on which the seller had
already increased the price to that here involved, thus indicating
that the buyer did not think the increase unreasonable.
Absent legal justification for vitiating the contract on the basis
of contract law, the decision may represent an attack on the validity
of fair trade laws, the buyer having agreed to sell "at full list price
in accordance with the Fair Trade Act . . ." The act in question
is the Illinois Fair Trade Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121 , §188 (1948
supp.), which was upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
Old Dearborn Distributing Corp. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299
U.S. 183 (1936). Resort to state law in interstate contracts was
made possible by the Miller-Tydings Enabling Act which removes
such agreements from the prohibition of the federal anti-trust and
unfair competition laws. 50 STAT. 693; 15 U.S.C. §1. The Illinois
Act states:
(1) That the buyer will not resell such commodity except at
the price stipulated by the vendor.
Whether the words "price stipulated" means the original price
in the contract, or refer to a subsequent price schedule, has not been
decided. The Ohio Act is similar to that of Illinois, except that a
"minimum price" is stipulated by the vendor. OHIO GEN. CODE
§6402-3 (A) (1945). In Ohio the very common practice of
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changing prices by publishing price schedules under the original
contract has never been questioned. Requiring a new contract for
each fluctuation would be unduly burdensome. Since the contract
in the instant case is a common practice under Fair Trade Acts,
the decision is a serious attack on the efficacy of Fair Trade
Agreements.
Jack R. Alton
ACCRUED INTEREST ON CUMULATIVE PREFERRED DIVIDENDS-A
DEBT OR AN ADDITIONAL OBLIGATION
Plaintiffs, Trustees in Liquidation of a South Carolina Corpora-
tion, claimed an income tax deduction for that portion of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the last asset, real estate, paid to the holders
of first preferred stock in partial liquidation of accumulated
interest on cumulative dividends thereon. This stock was ordinary
in all respects except that it included a provision for annually com-
pounded interest on unpaid dividends. Regular dividend payments
had been made, without formal declaration, for several years fol-
lowing its issue, but no earnings were made and no dividends were
declared or paid for seven years immediately preceding dissolution
of the corporation in 1927. As authority for the deduction, plaintiff
relied on 53 STAT. 12 (1939), 26 U.S.C. §23 (b) (1940), which
allows a deduction for "All interest paid or accrued within the
taxable year on indebtedness. . . ." From a judgment for the de-
fendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, in the district court, Burton
v. Bowers, 79 F. Supp. 418 (E.D.S.C. 1948), plaintiff appealed.
Held, affirmed. The payments were not "interest paid or indebted-
ness," where the corporation did not declare dividends or have any
earnings in years in which alleged interest on preferred dividends
accrued. Provisions for payment of compound interest on cumula-
tive preferred dividends in preferred stock certificates does not
convert the obligation of a corporation to its preferred stockholders
into an indebtedness due a creditor, but merely goes to the amount
of dividends to be paid if and when payable, and defines the rights
of preferred stockholders against other stockholders in the event
of liquidation, Burton v. Bowers, 172 F. 2d 429 (4th Cir. 1949).
The distinction between interest payments and dividends is of
great importance to corporations because of the deductibility of
the former for income tax purposes, 53 STAT. 12 (1939), 26 U.S.C.
§23 (b) (1940). The character of the payment is determined by the
nature of the security upon which it is made, i.e. if the security
evidences an indebtedness, the payment is interest; but if the
security represents a capital contribution, it is a dividend.
No comprehensive rule has been devised to effect this determina-
tion but certain criteria have evolved which singly or collectively
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sway the courts one way or the other: name given to the security,
intent of the parties, certainty of payment, maturity date, fund
out of which payment is to be made, right to share in profits,
subordination to claims of creditors, voting rights and subjectibil-
ity to risk of loss. Of course, in tax cases the factor of tax avoidance
plays an important role in judicial weighing of the criteria above.
As a result, a test involving the reasonableness of the ratio of debt
to capital in the corporate financial structure has recently been
formulated. Talbot Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
3 T.C. 95 (1944), aff'd, 146 F. 2d 809 (1st Cir. 1944), aff'd 326 U.S.
521 (1945).
Plaintiff's contention in the principal case that the interest
provision made the dividends owed the stockholders an indebtedness
could not have been sustained unless the nature of the security itself
had been affected thereby, as the dividends owed could not possibly
have become a debt in the absence of earnings or a fund out of
which they were payable, Miller v. Ratterman, 47 Ohio St. 141,
24 N.E. 496 (1890), New York, L. E. and W. R. Co. v. Nickals, 119
U.S. 296 (1886). If the nature of the security itself had been
changed by the provision, the "dividends" would have become
"interest" and hence an indebtedness, and the amount in contro-
versy would have become deductible as interest on the "interest."
53 STAT. 12 (1939), 26 U.S.C. §23 (b) (1940). Moreover, it would
appear that the "interest," the erstwhile dividend, would itself
have become deductible under these circumstances. The court,
however, concluded that the nature of the security involved capital
contribution and had not been changed. Factors considered in ar-
riving at this determination included: the terminology employed,
"preferred stock," the uncertainty of payment of the principal; the
absence of a fixed maturity date; the fact that "dividends" were to
be paid only out of earnings; and the subordination of the obliga-
tions concerned to the claims of general creditors.
No mention was made by the court of the intent of the parties in
formulating the interest provision itself. An argument might
have been proferred that the parties intended to establish a debtor-
creditor relationship as evidenced by the fixed, periodical return on
principal therewith provided for, but whether such an argument
would have swayed the court in its determination is doubtful,
especially since this was a tax case. The argument could readily
have been answered by cataloguing the interest provision as an
attempt to guarantee dividends, thereby rendering it inoperative in
the absence of earnings, Miller v. Ratterman, supra. See note, 123
A.L.R. 856 (1939), 18 C.J.S., CORPORATIONS, §228 (1939).
Stimulated by the holding of the principal case are queries as to
the possibility of a debtor-creditor relationship arising as a product
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of the interest provision either as to the deferred dividends when
earnings or funds from which they might be payable are present,
or as to the interest itself, in which event the interest might be de-
ductible from gross income as an ordinary expense.
The court in the principal case quoted extensively and with ap-
proval from Drayton-Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
19 B.T.A. 76 (1930), where interest on deferred dividends pro-
vided for in preferred stock certificates was held to be an additional
dividend and so not deductible either as interest on an indebtedness
or as an ordinary expense. From an examination of the facts of
the Drayton-Mills case, supra, it does not appear whether there
was any fund available from which dividends could have been paid
during the years in which the interest in controversy accrued.
Significant, however, is the fact that the corporation kept its ac-
counts on the accrual basis, but did not accrue the interest on the
deferred dividends. No account relative thereto was set up and no
entry made until the dividend was declared and its payments with
interest authorized. This indication of the intent of the parties
undoubtedly influenced the board in its decision.
A preferred stockholder is ordinarily not a creditor of the
corporation, except as to dividends already declared, even though
the stock may be secured by a mortgage or may bear a guaranteed
dividend. 18 C.J.S., CORPORATIONS, §228 (1939). The declaration of
dividends is ordinarily within the discretion of the directors of a
corporation, Smith v. Anltman & Taylor Co., 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
561 (1916), Aff'd without opinion 95 Ohio St. 415, 116 N.E. 1086
(1917) ; In re Railway Light and Power Co., 3 Ohio App. 253, 21
Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 95 (1914). A corporation having the power to
issue preferred stock and to fix the terms and conditions on which
it shall be issued may, however, provide for the payment of a cer-
tain rate of dividends on stock when earned, regardless of any
declaration by the directors, Warburton v. John Wanamaker Phil-
adelphia, 329 Pa. 5, 196 Atl. 506 (1938). Therefore, if an agree-
ment dispensing with the necessity of declaration is present, it is
possible for a debtor-creditor relationship to arise as to dividends
when they become payable. The interest provision in controversy
could be interpreted as the basis from which such an agreement
might be implied: it amounts to a recognition of the stockholder's
right to a return whenever dividends are payable, and it consti-
tutes an agreement to pay for the continued use of such unreturned
funds. The presence of other factors such as the failure to make
entries or keep accounts recognizing the accrued interest, as in the
Drayton-Mills case, supra, might lead the court to reject this con-
struction in the particular case.
A contract guaranteeing the payment of dividends was held
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void as against public policy because of its influence on the dis-
cretion of a director and accompanying interference with his
fiduciary character in Thomas v. Matthews, 94 Ohio St. 32, 113
N.E. 669 (1916). While this decision might shed doubt on the
validity of such an agreement in Ohio, the case is readily distin-
guishable in that an individual contract of a director was involved
as opposed to a provision in a stock certificate.
The question remains as to whether a debtor-creditor relation-
ship might exist under such a provision as to the interest itself.
Can such interest be considered as a separate obligation of the
corporation, or must it be treated as an additional dividend if the
nature of the security is held to remain unaffected as a capital con-
tribution?
A preferred stockholder cannot be both creditor and stockholder
by virtue of his ownership of stock alone. Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v.
Van Dyk and Reeves, 8 F. 2d 716 (2nd Cir. 1925), cert. denied, Van
Dyk v. Young, 269 U.S. 570 (1925) ; Armstrong v. Union Trust
and Savings Bank, 248 Fed. 268 (9th Cir. 1918). He may be one
or the other but not both unless a statute or charter provision
authorizing the issue of extraordinary preferred stock comes into
the picture. Augusta Trust Co. v. Augusta, H. and G. R. C., 134
Me. 314, 187 At. 1 (1936). Therefore, if the interest provision
will not effect a change in the nature of the security, it cannot
operate to create a separate relationship even though such might be
the intent of the parties as evidenced by the fixed nature of the
return provided for. Even this fixation, argument is weak in the
principal case since the provision is for "compound" interest and
thus indicates an expectancy of possible delay in payment. No con-
sideration apart from the contribution to capital could be found
to sustain the interest obligation on the theory that a separate
contract existed in relation thereto.
It is submitted that such an interest provision as that involved
in the principal case is incapable of itself effecting a change either
in the nature of the security involved or in the stockholder-corpora-
tion relationship as to the interest therein provided. It is merely
one more factor bearing upon the determination of the court as
to the basic nature of the security involved and is important in
this respect only as considered in conjunction with the criteria
enumerated above, the degree of import being relatively contingent
upon the type of controversy in which the question arises. How-
ever, some significance might attach to the provision independently
in the form of a waiver of the necessity for declaration of divi-
dends by directors when funds from which they might be paid
are available.
Bernard P. Bernardo
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CORPORATIONS-COMPENSATION-OFFICE-DIRECTORS
Plaintiff stockholder filed a derivative action in equity to
recover $51,000 additional compensation paid to defendant Tom
Girdler by defendant corporation. After a judgment for plaintiff
in the trial court, the parties have stipulated that the salaries paid
were reasonable in amount and that the conduct of the directors
was in no way deceitful or fraudulent. The primary issue upon
appeal was whether the additional compensation was unlawful as
an ultra vires act. Held, the action was lawful. Holmes v. Republic
Steel Corp., 84 N.E. 2d 508 (Ohio App. 1948).
It is now the well-settled rule that directors of a corporation
cannot recover compensation, in any form, for their services when
rendered in the line of their duty as such, whether eo nomine as
directors, officers, members of committees, or otherwise, unless com-
pensation for such services is expressly provided for or agreed upon
in a statute, charter, or by a resolution of stockholders before the
services are rendered. Upright v. Brown, 98 F. 2d 802 (2d Cir.
1938), Stevens v. Ind. Comm., 346 Ill. 495, 179 N.E. 102 (1932),
Henry Wood's Sonts Co. v.Schaefer, 173 Mass. 443, 53 N.E. 881
(1899), Ten Eyck v. Pontiac, 0. & P. A. R. Co., 74 Mich. 226, 41
N.W. 905 (1889), 13 Am. Jur., Corp., §1027 (1941). The power to
vote a salary to any director is never an inherent power of the
board of directors. Holder v. Lafayette, B. & M. Co., 71 Ill. 106
(1897), Godley v. Crandall & G. Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818
(1914).
Although the board of directors may be given the power to fix
their own salaries, their action may be invalidated by the partici-
pation of the director, whose salary is fixed, in the vote or meeting
fixing his own compensation. Briggs v. Gilbert Grocery Co., 116
Ohio St. 343, 156 N.E. 494 (1927), State ex rel. Squire v. Miller, 62
Ohio App. 43, 23 N.E. 2d 321 (1939), 175 A.L.R. 578. According
to one writer, Ohio is in the minority by holding such action void,
instead of voidable. 6 Ohio St. L. J. 66 (1939). The defendant in
the principal case took no part in the voting or discussion of his
salary so that problem cannot be raised on the facts.
The resolution of the board of directors stated that the salary
of defendant as chairman was fixed at the rate of $175,000 per year,
"plus any additional amount, if any, as the board of directors may
determine prior to December 31, 1940." (Emphasis supplied.) It
is the contention of the plaintiff that such resolution is an ultra
vires act. The court found the authority for the board of directors
to fix officers' compensation in the New Jersey statutes and went on
to find the additional compensation or bonus was, along with the
annual salary, fixed by this resolution. N.J.S.A. 14:3-1 (e) (1937).
An act or contract of a corporation is ultra vires when it is
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beyond the powers expressly or impliedly conferred upon the cor-
poration. Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman P. C. Co., 139 U.S. 24
(1890), Cleveland & M. R. Co., v. Furnace Co., 37 Ohio St. 321
(1881). Thus, if one determines there was no express agreement
to pay the bonus to defendant, the resolution passed in December,
1940, would be clearly ultra vires because the directors cannot vote
themselves "back pay" as compensation for services theretofore
rendered. Briggs v. Gilbert Grocery Co., supra, State ex rel. Squire
v. Miller, supra, State ex rel. Lawrence v. People's Mut. Ben. Ass'n.,
42 Ohio St. 579 (1885), Holder v. Lafayette B. & M. R. Co., supra,
Thauer v. Gaebler, 202 Wis. 296, 232 N.W. 561 (1930). The trial
court determined this to be the situation and in so holding stated,
".... that board of directors shall fix compensation of all officers
did not require directors to specify in the resolution the exact
amount an officer of the corporation was to be paid, but, if they did
not, then they were required to establish a formula by which it
could be computed without mistake or misunderstanding." Holmes
v. Republic Steel Corp., 69 N.E. 2d 396 (Ohio C.P. 1946). Strict
interpretation of such agreements has been adopted in other juris-
dictions and is probably rooted in the notion that a director is a
fiduciary of the corporation and where self-interests of directors
appear the courts should be wary in order that a corporation may
not be milked thereby. Althouse v. Colliery Co., 227 Pa. 580, 76 Atl.
316 (1910), Brophy v. Amer. Brewing Co., 211 Pa. 596, 61 Atl. 123
(1905), Kilpatrick v. Penrose F. B. Co., 49 Pa. 118 (1865).
One bit of testimony in the principal case was stressed by the
trial court and overlooked by this court. Defendant Girdler was
asked on the stand, "You had no agreement to get more?" His
answer was, "I had no agreement of any kind whatever about any
additional compensation." This would seem to substantiate the trial
court's finding of no express contract.
The modern tendency is to uphold bonus agreements on the
theory that they are a valid incentive to corporate management to
increase profits and thereby incidentally benefit themselves. Rogers
-v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1932), Putnam v. Shoe Corp., 307 Mo. 74, 269
S.W. 593 (1925), Bennett v. Madison Sales Co., 264 Ky. 728, 95
S.W. 2d 604 (1936). In fact, the principal case is an example of
how a court may strain to make an express contract out of vague
and uncertain words to uphold such a broad general policy. Upon
these same or similar facts it is possible that the Ohio Supreme
-Court, with its heritage of strictness in dealing with such matters,
,could find such action of the board of directors to be ultra vires.
David W. Hart
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS- COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
Plaintiff, in an action for divorce, sought to prove the marital
status of the plaintiff and defendant by establishing a common
law marriage. It was shown that the parties in good faith agreed
to become husband and wife and held themselves out as such during
twelve days that they cohabited at a tourist camp. There was no
holding out by the parties as husband and wife in the immediate
community in which they lived upon return from the tourist camp
sojourn, but the plaintiff later entered a hospital where she and
the twins, there born to her and defendant, were registered under
defendant's name. Defendant appealed from a decree of divorce
granted to the plaintiff, contending that the decree was not sup-
ported by the evidence and contrary to law. Held, Judgment af-
firmed. The plaintiff did establish a common law marriage re-
lationship with the defendant. Gatterdam v. Gatterdam, 85 N.E.
2d 526 (Ohio App. 1949), appeal dismissed, 151 Ohio St. 551
(1949).
Before proceeding to the appellant's argument that no marital
relationship was established, the court of appeals disposed of the
appellee's objection to its jurisdiction by holding that the court of
appeals was not precluded from weighing evidence on the ground
that the defendant's motion for new trial was premature because
it was filed after the opinion of the trial court and before the judg-
ment entry. This somewhat liberal construction of Ohio General
Code Section 11578 is found in an earlier case where such early
filing of a motion for new trial was given effect. In re Lowry's
Estate, 140 Ohio St. 223, 42 N.E. 2d 987 (1942).
Common law marriages are recognized and valid in Ohio.
Carmichael v. State, 12 Ohio St. 553 (1861); Umbenhower v.
Lab us, 85 Ohio St. 238, 97 N.E. 832 (1912) ; Johnson v. Wolford,
117 Ohio St. 136, 157 N.E. 385 (1927) ; Lumas v. Lumas, 26 Ohio
App. 502, 160 N.E. 480 (1927). But as a matter of public policy
such marriages are not favored. In re Redmond, 135 Ohio St. 554,
21 N.E. 2d 659 (1939).
The stepping stones frequently associated as essential to estab-
lishment of a common law marriage are an agreement or consent to
become husband and wife immediately at the time of agreement
and cohabitation accompanied by mutual assumption openly of
marital duties and obligations. The rule has been announced in
Ohio that to constitute a common law marriage, an agreement in
praesenti must be followed by cohabitation as husband and wife,
and the parties must be treated and reputed as being married in
the community and circle in which they move. Carmichael v.
State, Supra; Johnson v. Wolford, Supra; Markley v. Hudson, 143
Ohio St. 163, 54 N.E. 2d 304 (1944) ; Howard v. Central National
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Bank, 21 Ohio App. 74, 152 N.E. 784 (1926) ; Lumas v. Lumas,
supra; Respole v. Respole, 70 N.E. 2d 465 (Ohio C.P. 1946).
Mutual promises to marry in the future, not present in the
principal case, though made between parties competent to contract,
and followed by cohabitation as husband and wife, are not, in them-
selves, a valid marriage. Duncan v. Duncan, 10 Ohio St. 181
(1859) ; Umbenhower v. Labus, Supra.
The court in the principal case, after careful analysis, cites with
approval those authorities and decisions which embrace the theory
that cohabitation and repute of marriage are not an essential of
the legality of the relationship, but merely evidence of an essential;
i.e., consent. 2 Kent's Commentaries 86, 87; 33 Am. Jur. 199;
Peters v. Peters, 73 Colo. 271, 215 Pac. 128 (1923); Lefkoff v.
Sicro, 189 Ga. 554, 6 S.E. 2d 687 (1939) ; NorrelU v. Norrell, 220
Ind. 398, 44 N.E. 2d 97 (1942) ; Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 69
N.W. 31 (1896).
Under the statutes and decisions of the eighteen states which
authorize common law marriage, including Ohio, the weight of
authority holds that to constitute such marriage there must be a.
present agreement between a man and woman, eligible to enter such
relationship, to take each other as man and wife, and this must be
followed by hohabitation. KEEZER, Marriage and Divorce §20 (3d
ed. 1946).
The court's discussion in the principal cases advocating the
view that cohabitation and repute of marriage are evidentiary must
be viewed as little more than a well considered dictum in view of
the factual existence of cohabitation and at least a limited holding
out as husband and wife. For a decision to be authority for the
proposition that a marriage is complete by the contract, the case
must not embrace in its facts cohabitation or any form of consum-
mation, since it would not then be a case of marriage by contract
only.
Appellant contended that the relationship was illicit in its incep-
tion and so continued at all times. This view was not accepted by
the trial court and was likewise rejected by the court of appeals.
The fact that the legitimacy of children was involved appeared to
play its usual role even though the birth and presence of the twins
were not permitted to change the factors essential to the common
law marriage. Equally persuasive was the fact that the plaintiff
was not seeking property rights but on the contrary was seeking the
dissolution of a marital relationship she claimed existed.
The growing unpopularity of common law marriage is shown
by the fact that in recent years it has ceased to exist in Delaware,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, and New Jersey by express pro-
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hibitory legislation, and has been judicially repudiated elsewhere.
KEEZER, Marriage and Divorce §30 (3d ed. 1946).
Until the abrogation of common law marriage by express
legislation in Ohio a sound judicial approach to its maintenance
must be found and applied with pattern-like consistency. For pur-
poses of public policy and to prevent fraud, strong proof of the
marriage contract should be required. As a practical matter this
proof is usually supplied by showing cohabitation and a holding
out as man and wife. However, where the contract is conclusively
proved by other evidence, the absence of proof of cohabitation and
a holding out should not be allowed to defeat the marriage, par-
ticularly where the rights of innocent persons are involved.
Lowell B. Howard
SPECIFIC PERFORAIANCE-ORAL CONTRACT TO MAKE WILL
In performance of her part of an oral contract with one Harper,
whereby he agreed to bequeath and devise to her one-half of his
estate, plaintiff served as his housekeeper, cook, practical nurse,
business associate and secretary for about two years prior to his
death, at which time she learned that he had died intestate. In an
action in the nature of specific performance brought against Har-
per's administratrix, held: An oral contract to make a will is unen-
forceable by virtue of Ohio General Code Section 10504-3a, and
payment of consideration consisting of pecuniarily compensable
services will not remove such a contract from the operation of the
section. Snyder v. Warde, 151 Ohio St. 426 (Court of Appeals
reversed and judgment of Common Pleas Court affirmed).
Payment of the consideration is not sufficient to take an oral
contract out of the statute of frauds. Sites v. Keller, 6 Ohio 483
(1834), Pollard v. Kinner, 6 Ohio 528 (1834). This is just as true
where the consideration consists of personal services. Hodges v.
Ettinge', 127 Ohio St. 460, 189 N.E. 113 (1934). Contracts or
agreements to make a will with reference to both real and personal
property are within the statute of frauds. Howard v. Brower, 37
Ohio St. 402 (1881) ; Shahan, Ex'r v. Swan, 48 Ohio St. 25, 26 N.E.
222 (1891). Notwithstanding the established rule, specific perform-
ance of a contract in parol may be had on the ground that the con-
sideration has been paid in personal services, not intended to be
and not susceptible of being measured by a pecuniary standard,
Shahan, E.'r v. Swan, supra, Newbold v. Michael, 110 Ohio St. 588,
144 N.E. 715 (1924) ; or on the grounds that the contract has been
so far executed that a refusal would operate as a fraud upon the
party who has performed and would result in a denial of just com-
pensation. Newbold v. Michael, supra.
The result in the principal case is in accord with the rule enunci-
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ated in Newbold v. Michael, supra, the Supreme Court merely hold-
ing that while the calculation of the value of the services performed
might be complicated it did not change their character so as to make
them non-compensable by pecuniary standards. The court, in a
carefully considered opinion by Judge Stewart, went further, how-
ever, and considered but left for an appropriate future decision the
question of whether an oral contract to make a will could ever, under
any circumstances, be removed from the bar of Ohio General Code
Section 10504-3a. Since the general statutes of frauds (Ohio Gen-
eral Code Sections 8620 and 8621) had been in effect in Ohio since
1810 the contention was made that the enactment by the General
Assembly in 1935 of Section 10504-3a was an absolute expression
of the legislative intent to require, without exception, any agree-
ment to make a will or a devise or bequest by will to be in writing
in order to be enforceable. The inclusion of the section in the chap-
ter designated "Wills" rather than in the chapter designated "Stat-
utes on Frauds and Perjuries" was pointed out as indicia that a dis-
tinction was being made from the general statutes of frauds,
whereby the new section constituted a rule of evidence as as to make
any and all oral agreements to make a will absolutely unenforce-
able. The syllabus in Ayres v. Cook, 140 Ohio St. 281, 43 N.E. 2d
287 (1942), which states that proper partial performance will take
an oral agreement out of the operation of Section 10504-3a, is com-
mented upon, but since that case involved a contract entered into
prior to the enactment of the statute and did not involve any ques-
tion of personal services, the court indicated that it would not hesi-
tate to re-examine the rule of law as there enunciated when the
issue properly arose.
The Court of Appeals for Medina County, however, granted a
decree of specific performance on an oral contract to devise real
estate by will, holding that the doctrine of partial performance ap-
plied notwithstanding Ohio General Code Sections 8621 and
10504-3a, and citing Ayres v. Cook, supra, as authority, Emley,
Ex'r v. Selepchek, 76 Ohio App. 257, 63 N.E. 2d 919 (1945).
The reasons for statutory enactments are manifold, but not
the least among them is the desire to express statutorily a
rule of law having its origin in judicial construction. Thus
the General Assembly, in enacting Ohio General Code Section
10504-3a, may merely have been restating the rule that the general
statute of frauds applied to wills, while at the same time prescrib-
ing the proper procedure for making agreements regarding the
making of wills. It is felt that this possibility should be kept in
mind when the question left unanswered in the principal case prop-
erly arises, and, in the absence of more clear and convincing proof
of the legislative intent than is there presented, should prevail to
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uphold the equitable doctrine of partial performance presently so
deep-rooted in our law.
Arthur J. Prendergast, Jr.
TORTS - ACTION BY CHILD FOR PRE-NATAL INJURIES
An infant brought an action through her next friend against
defendant bus company for injuries received while plaintiff was
in her mother's womb. Her mother, while pregnant, was a paying
passenger on defendant's bus when she was injured by defendant's
alleged negligent act, which plaintiff claims also caused permanent
injuries to her at a time when she was viable, i.e. capable of exist-
ing independently of her mother. Demurrer by the defendant was
sustained by the trial judge. This judgment was reversed by the
Court of Appeals and the case certified to the Supreme Court be-
cause of a conflict with a decision of another Court of Appeals.
Held, for plaintiff, affirming the Court of Appeals decision. Plaintiff
was capable of independent existence at the time of the injury
and therefore was a person, entitled to the protection of Section 16,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, providing that the courts shall
be open to afford a remedy to any person injured. Williams, an In-
fant v. The Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, - N.E. 2d
-(1949).
This decision is directly contrary to the great number of
American decisions dealing with this problem. Judge Matthias,
writing for a unanimous court, reviewed those precedents before
holding that a cause of action existed. A Massachusetts opinion
written by then Chief Justice Holmes is the basis for denial of re-
covery in cases of this type. Dietrich, Adm'r v. Inhabitants of
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884). In that case
a woman, between four and five months advanced in pregnancy,
was injured, causing the child to be prematurely born shortly
thereafter. It died after surviving a few minutes. In an action
brought by the administrator, the existence of a cause of action
was denied. It should be noted that the child was not viable, nor
did it survive the accident. Nevertheless, subsequent cases used
the broad language of the opinion to deny recovery where the child
was viable and did survive. One case, typical of those denying re-
covery, listed the reasons as follows:
1. lack of authority;
2. practical inconvenience and possible injustice;
3. no separate entity apart from the mother, and therefore no
duty of care;
4. no person or human being in esse at the time of the accident.
Drobizer v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
Judge Matthias ably answered these arguments in his opinion.
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Authority was found in a Canadian case allowing recovery, Mort-
treal Tramways v. Le Veille, 4 D. L.R. 337 (1933), and in a Cali-
fornia case allowing a cause of action based on a statutory provision
that "a child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an exist-
ing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the
event of its subsequent birth." CAL. Civ. CODE §29 (1941), Scott v.
McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939), aff'd
Cal. 2d ,93 P. 2d 562 (1939). A recent federal case, not
cited by Judge Matthias, denied a summary judgment in favor of
defendant doctor, being sued for injuries received when plaintiff
infant was being taken from its mother's womb. Bonbrest v. Kotz,
65 F. Supp. 138 (1946). See note, 32 VA. L. REv. 1203 (1946).
The injury, however, was directly to the child during birth, not
prior to birth as in the principal case.
In answering the argument that injustice may result from
granting a cause of action, Judge Matthias said ". . . it seems
clear that adequate safeguards could be established by requiring
sufficient proof by competent medical evidence, which is possible
at least in many cases." The basis for the holding of the principal
case, that a viable foetus is a person, disposes of the other argu-
ments of the Drobner case.
The opinion did not consider another problem which has pre-
vented recovery in two similar cases. It has been held that a child
cannot recover for pre-natal injuries suffered while its mother was
a paying passenger on a public conveyance because the contract for
transportation extended to the mother only. Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights Ry. Co., 139 N.Y.C. 367, 154 App. Div. 667, Appeal dis-
missed 209 N.Y. 515 (1913) ; Walker v. Great Northern Ry., L.R
28 Ir. 69 (1890). The Ohio Supreme Court did not follow these
decisions, correctly, it would seem, for a contractual relation is
not necessary to bring the tort action.
Even if the principal case is adopted generally, other problems
may arise. If the unborn child, though viable, is killed in the acci-
dent, can his administrator bring an action for wrongful death?
Since, by the principal decision, the unborn child is a person, it
would seem that there should be such an action. Further, the court,
at p. 120 of the opinion, intimates that such an action would sur-
vive, saying in reference to the decision in the Dietrich case, supra,
"The significant fact, however, is that the child could not survive
and no right of action therefore accrued to the child, which could
survive in favor of the child's representative." However, the prin-
cipal decision on its facts would not warrant a wrongful death
action, for here the child did survive. Judge Matthias said, "Let us
be reminded that in the instant case we are dealing with a viable
child, one capable of living and which demonstrated its capacity to
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survive by surviving," at p. 128. Had the child died, how could any
damages to the survivors be assessed? Damages, e.g., for possible
future support, would be extremely speculative. In view of this,
survival might justifiably be made a condition subsequent to the
right to bring the action.
If the injury occurs before the foetus is viable, but the foetus is
later born suffering the effects of the injuries, is there a cause of
action in favor of the child? Although human sympathies would
dictate an affirmative answer, it seems clear from the principal
decision that there is no cause of action by the child because it was
not a person at the time of injury. However, when the occasion
arises, the Ohio Supreme Court may well allow the mother to re-
cover for the injuries to the child, since at the time of the accident,
the child was a part of her. Otherwise, the injuries would go un-
compensated.
The principal decision then, appears to be the first in an Ameri-
can court of last resort, in the absence of statute, allowing a cause
of action to the child for pre-natal injuries suffered while viable.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has commendably broken away from
precedents based on dicta and outmoded medical ideas. The facts in
the instant case differ from those in the Dietrich case, supra, in that
here the child was viable at the time of injury and now survives
unable to care for itself as a result of the accident. The decision
aligns the law of torts with the law of property and the criminal
law, which long have considered the foetus an entity. PROSSER,
ToRTS 189-190 (1941). Justice Holmes' concept of the common law
-"the felt necessities of the times," has triumphed over his own
decision of sixty-five years ago.
Jack R. Alton
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